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LUIS SÁEZ RUEDA
Translated from the Spanish by Marcus Weigelt
We have, since the beginning of the 20th century, been witness to a conflict,
occasionally explicit but for the most part tacit, between two philosophical
traditions: the analytic and the continental. This claim might initially seem
unprompted or exaggerated because it appears to presuppose the existence of
two homogeneous totalities, which conflicts with the evident diversity of
philosophical positions ascribed to each of the them.
This essay tries to show that we can indeed talk of two traditions and that
between them there exists an ontological gap that endures in our days. It
concerns what I shall here call the incommensurability between the
continental ontology of events and the analytic ontology of facts. Both these
ontologies have remained constant during 20th Century discourse in their
respective circles, despite the profound differences between the philosophical
positions within them. If this hypothesis were confirmed, we would be
justified to talk of traditions in conflict, provided that we thereby refer not to
two internally homogeneous unities but to two mosaics of theories that appear
unified only when they are brought face to face with each other.
I shall try to give shape to this central thesis in three steps. I will start with
a diagnosis of the continental ontology of events in connection with problems
of the philosophy of mind. I will thereby regard as exemplary the conflict
between a phenomenological conception on the one hand and the positions of
Dennett and likewise Searle on the other (Part 1). I shall then try to
demonstrate the way in which this ontology persists in continental philosophy
through various transformations, in a process which I shall describe as “a
locating of sense in the world” (Part 2). Finally, I will analyze the contrast of
this ontology with the project of the naturalization of meaning in the analytic
line of thought, a project that presupposes the ontology of facts mentioned
above (Part 3).
1. The phenomenological ontology of acts: regarding Dennett and Searle in
the philosophy of mind
Within phenomenology we may get a first idea of what I have called
ontology of acts. When we confront it with Daniel Dennett’s conception of the
mind we can detect one of its central characteristics: it understands the real as
a sense constituted from the life-world, the latter being a sphere of acts and not
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of rules. Another of its traits becomes apparent when we compare it with the
position of John Searle: the fact that it affirms an a priori correlation between
the constitution and the self-presentation of the real.
The issue raised by Dennett in the philosophy of mind has its origin in
functionalism. Functionalism, as is well known, identifies the nature of a
mental state with its function within a system of causal relations, that is, with
its position and causal role in a functional organization by means of which
information is processed. Its currently predominant version is that of
computationalism, the basic idea of which is that a functional state is a
computational state.
The original development of this programmatic theory was guided by the
work of Turing.1 His proposals at the time meant an upheaval similar to the one
that we witness today caused by the project of artificial intelligence (AI). We
may distinguish, with a terminology expanded by Searle, between weak AI –
the point of view that the cerebral (and mental) processes can be simulated
computationally – and strong AI – according to which having a program is all
that having a mind consists of.2 Dennett’s conception is consistent with this
second line of thought.
Dennett gives the significant title of heterophenomenology to the basic
orientation of his project.3 The heterophenomenological method begins by
recognizing the existence of mental states that can be characterized in
intentionalist terms in order to show, in a second step, that this existence is
equivalent to the one that we attribute to illusions. With respect to what matters
here, this method implies that mental phenomena are no longer described in a
way in which we suppose that a phenomenologist would describe them. The
latter would invoke experiences in the first person, in exactly the way in which
they are understood from within, which provides information about what the
intentional phenomenon is like for the subject, that is, what it is like within his
introspective sphere. This is how the various inhabitants of the
phenomenological garden are identified. In order to guard against prejudice,
such a description should be neutral, and this, according to Dennett, forces us
to adopt the third person perspective, that of an observer. In order to do so we
adopt the tactics of leaving the subject which relates his phenomenological
world and of transcribing his account as an interpreted text. Dennett calls this
narrative fiction the heterophenomenological world: a world that constitutes a
neutral and exact picture of what it is like to be that subject. The second step
of this method consists in showing that the role of the agent presupposed as
subject of this world can actually be played by a computational process. In
such a case, consciousness and the whole intentional – phenomenological –
world are simply eliminated.
With regard to Husserl, this result would mean that the things floating in the
stream of consciousness are not what we thought they were and that we have
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broken the spell of the phenomenological garden.4 Demystifying this
phenomenological garden implies showing, against Husserl, the absence of
phenomenology, for it takes the results of phenomenological introspection to
be explainable from the third person perspective.5
What Dennett does is, from a certain point of view, to question Descartes’
thesis that consciousness is an irreducible reality.6 His challenge is that what
according to Descartes cannot be a dream, that is, self-consciousness, may
itself be caused by a dream (an anonymous computation of connectionist
nature). Dennett’s error with respect to Descartes can be clarified if we
consider the kind of experiences that the former associates with what he calls
the inhabitants of the phenomenological garden. This list includes experiences
of the external world (such as sounds and smells), experiences of the purely
internal world (such as memories, images of fancy or sudden intuitions) and
emotive experiences (such as tickle, pride, fear or remorse).7
When Dennett tries to show that this type of experience is produced within
a complex mechanical organization, that is, that the first person perspective
does not provide truth, he believes himself to be demolishing Descartes’
edifice and with it phenomenology. What he is not taking into account is that
Descartes would have no difficulties to agree with him. In the Meditations on
First Philosophy the French thinker expresses himself absolutely convincingly
in this respect. Persuaded that all contents of the mind might be a product of
fiction, he supposes, in the second meditation, that he is dreaming. And he
affirms that what is beyond all doubt, even during this mental experiment, is
nothing that counts as contents of inner experiences, such as sensations,
imaginings, perceptions or volitions. None of these, according to Descartes,
amount to an irreducible experience, to a certain and straightforward reality.
There is nothing in the content itself of the perception of some men walking
in the street which would prevent us from supposing, he says, that they were
hats and coats underneath which automata could be hidden. In this –
surprisingly to the computationalist – Descartes concedes to Dennett: whether
or not that which the subject experiences possesses an intimate qualitative
character is irrelevant with regard to the suspicion that it may constitute only
an appearance for me, an appearance which might turn out fictitious. What,
then, is the indubitable element? The indubitable element, that which by itself
pertains to consciousness and is part of the irreducible I, is the act of attending
to these contents; it is neither the perception nor the experienced content, not
even the perceiving insofar as it is a mental occurrence, but the act by which I
attend to what I am perceiving or to what I seem to perceive. And what
Descartes wants to say with this is that what properly belongs to the sphere of
the subject is the dimension of self-apprehension in actu.
Everything that Dennett includes as component of the phenomenological
garden has the form of a content that is experienced. In no way does he refer
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to the acts themselves by means of which one attends to these contents. And
this, in virtue of the task itself of heterophenomenology, could not be any other
way. If this method, as we have seen, proceeds from a third person description
of the inner phenomenological world, then it is a method which excludes the
actual dimensions of the acts as a matter of principle. If he had realized that
the dimension of acts which Descartes refers to is, as a matter of principle,
untranslatable into any form of objectively expressed information then it
should have been clear to Dennett that this step already constitutes a
corruption of that which has to be explained, namely the inner phenomenon.
Hintikka has shown this with great mastery by taking the exemplary case of an
act in the Cartesian world: the one expressed in the I think, therefore I exist. If
this self-reflective act were translatable into an abstract logical objectification,
then it could be considered a syllogism, a chain of reasoning composed of
logical steps: a) All that thinks exists; b) I think; c) Therefore I exist. And this
syllogism is either false or devoid of content. False, because in accordance
with it Hamlet, who is made to think by Shakespeare, should have to exist.
Empty because if, in order to save this situation, we would answer that we only
refer to actual beings we would clearly be guilty of a petitio principi. This
means that the truth of Descartes’ argument is rooted in what is the result of a
performative act, an act the content of which can only be apprehended in actu:
the I think can never adopt the form it thinks.8 To my mind, these reflections
lead to a destructive criticism of Dennett’s very project (and along with it to
that of any imaginable form of eliminative functionalism): it simply excludes
a priori that which has to be explained and, in consequence, offers no
explanation of consciousness.
It is precisely this dimension of an act that Husserl invokes in his
transformation of Cartesianism.9 In phenomenological reflection, this
Cartesian orientation is made good use of, but is also vigorously elaborated
and deepened. The phenomenological method does not aspire to get access
merely to the self-consciousness of the I think (which is actually empty), but
to a whole field of transcendental experience which Husserl calls life-world
(Lebenswelt). The phenomenological attitude lays open a new spectacle of
the world which is articulated by two poles, one objective (the cogitatum or
nóema), the other subjective (the thought of the object: cogitatio or nóesis).
The appearance of the cogitatum as generated in the life-world coincides with
the discovery of the real as a phenomenon of sense: a content that shows itself
is reduced to the mode in which it shows itself (to the sense). Simultaneously,
the world of the subject is rediscovered as a sphere of intentional acts of
experience. It is indeed a sense that is experienced; on the basis of it we form
an experience. What is important with respect to our problem is that this
dimension of the act that constitutes the apprehension of a mode of presenting
itself, of a sense, cannot be translated into an intellectual operation
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susceptible of empirical explication or description from the perspective of a
spectator. 
This is the key to the ontology of acts which I wanted to emphasize as
underlying phenomenology. The following is a summary account of its central
claim. The irreducible character of intentional consciousness is due to the fact
that its Being has the dynamic form of acts, that is, there is one dimension of
its nature that is not reducible to a static content of which we could give a
distanced explanation or description. In the following I will provide more
details to the sketch of this ontology, and I will show how its way of resisting
Dennett’s challenge differs from the one proposed by Searle. 
In the words of Searle we may say that Dennett’s project tries to show that
there are no intrinsic mental phenomena, that is to say, that there are no
phenomena that would have a first person ontology.10 Against this, Searle tries
to show that the internal world of the subject has a qualitative character that is
not reducible to formalization. With this line of argument he has for decades
insisted on the difference between computation and comprehension. There is
a mental experiment that the author tends to make use of, which is already
commonplace in the analytic schools, and which people have been using as a
model for justifying an anti-computationalist position: the so called mental
experiment of the Chinese room. In this Gedankenexperiment Searle invites us
to imagine that, in a situation analogous to that of a computer that receives
inputs and emits outputs, we find ourselves in a room from which we
communicate with the outside world in Chinese. In reality, we do not know
Chinese, but we can simulate a conversation with a Chinese speaker situated
outside and answering to questions by means of the use of a series of rules
(given to us in our native language) which allow us to produce, and send
outside the room, strings of Chinese symbols depending on the strings of
symbols, likewise Chinese, which we receive through a connecting channel.
Searle maintains that, given that we do not know Chinese, we do not
comprehend the linguistic content by operating in this way and that such an
activity of manipulating symbols cannot be considered an intentional activity,
given that it is not an activity about that which the symbols represent. What
this argument makes quite clear, according to Searle, is that computational
operations, in so far as they are formal, are not in themselves sufficient as
conditions of comprehension, and that the semantics is not intrinsic to the
syntax.
We may stress two differences between the phenomenological approach
and this Searlean argument. The first concerns the fact that Searle usually links
the qualitative states that have reality in the first person with contents and not
necessarily with acts. This is the case, for instance, when he refers to the
sensation of pain.11 The advantage of the continental phenomenological
position becomes visible here. The mere subjective existence of the qualia (the
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qualitative dimension of mental states) does not in principle represent any
reason against the thesis that they are determined from below, from merely
functional conditions. This, as we have seen, is justifiable from Descartes’
point of view and, if the above considerations are true, does not constitute a
serious obstacle against Dennett’s suspicion. In order to withstand this
suspicion it is necessary that we clarify not the content of the mental state but
the act itself of its apprehension. And furthermore: not of the act understood
as the occurrence of the mental state, for in that case there would be no
difference with the trivial computational occurrence whereby, say, in a
computer a window of Windows is opened. We are dealing with a performative
act by means of which the mental occurrence (for instance a perception) is
immediately accompanied by an attending to this occurrence. This other
dimension, the properly Cartesian one, is that which, as we have seen, cannot
be understood as derivative with respect to rules (Dennett), but only as a
simple act (Hintikka).
The second difference concerns the relation between the world given in the
first person perspective and the external or objective world. Phenomenology
does not simply wish to affirm the existence of phenomena that, as Searle says,
possess an ontology of the first person and whose existence would have to be
recognized along with the realities described from the third person
perspective. Searle takes good care to deny a necessary link between the two.
After showing that the intentional mental states do not rest against a
background of beliefs and capacities, he insists that it does not matter to the
world how we represent or experience it, and that it is not relative to the above
background.12 In view of this point we would have to say that the conception
of the real as phenomenon of sense, already mentioned as a characteristic of
phenomenology, implies that the reference made by consciousness is already
a lived reference, one that is experienced as meaningful in the act of
apprehension. And this means that there is nothing like a pure reference or an
objective state of affairs to which a sense is further added. The reference itself
is a mode of being comprehended. Here, the sense is the reference. The
advantage that this phenomenological conception offers over the Searlean one
when it comes to answering to Dennett lies in the fact that it enables us to
unmask the very aim of heterophenomonology as lacking in sense. This aim is
actually founded on an illusion: the illusion that there exists something like a
pure and neutral perspective of an impartial spectator.
This unity of subject and world, of the experiencing and the experienced, is
what Husserl qualified as the a priori correlation of nóesis and nóema.13 The
meaning of this profound concept, which recurs throughout his work, helps to
clarify the ontology of acts from another viewpoint. Not only the experiencing
possesses a dynamic texture but also, as correlate of it, the experienced. To say
that reality is a phenomenon of sense means that it is not reduced to a static
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experienced content. Not the real as phenomenon is present to consciousness,
but the act itself of becoming present. This is why Husserl says that
phenomenology is the description of that which is presented by itself.14 And in
understanding the real as presenting itself or as giving itself, the
phenomenologist raises the dynamic dimension of this presenting of itself to
experience to the rank of the ontologically primordial, and this we must not
mistake for a static content that can be designated.
We can already guess why the ontology of acts is a particular case of the
ontology of events. The acts of experiencing and being experienced take place,
they occur. And we can also understand in which sense this ontology is
opposed to what we call facts: the dynamis of the event is not something we
can designate, it is not a fact or a factual reality. This latter ontology, however,
is that which both Dennett and Searle, despite their difference, apply in their
analysis of mental states.
2. The Vicissitudes of the Continental Ontology of Events
The above considerations allow us to make a general characterization of the
conflict between the ontologies of events and of facts, which separate the
continental and the analytic traditions. Before investigating its exact
manifestations, I would like to specify synthetically the meaning given to
these concepts. The ontology of events recognizes a dynamic and energetic
dimension in the texture of the real which the term phenomenon contains in its
Greek origin. It is the dimension of the showing itself or of the being
constituted of a content which is distinct from the dimension, we could say
horizontal rather than vertical, of the constituted or exhibited content. Such an
ontology always features as part of the real an element that cannot be
represented, that is to say, an element which cannot be translated as an
objectivity capable of explanation or designation from the point of view of a
third person, or distanced spectator. This ontology can be articulated in a
language game, to speak metaphorically, in which we oppose signifying force
to delineable sense, vertical intension to horizontal extension, dynamicity to
staticity, energy to form. The ontology of facts, on the other hand, tends to
comprehend the real as a space of entities that can be designated or
reconstructed in law-like descriptions or explanations. The factual, however, is
not in this case reduced to the empirical or demonstrable such as is common
in a typically verificationist or positivist conception. It coincides, in its
broadest sense, with that which is capable of being represented or described,
that is, that which can be delineated or designated by an observer. If, in order
to express the character of an event that cannot be represented, we have made
use of contrasting terms, it would seem appropriate to use a typically
analytical opposition in this second case. The most adequate may be the one
that Wittgenstein uses in his Philosophical Investigations,15 when he refers to
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the difference between grammatical expressions and factual (or empirical)
expressions. The former are those that in a determinate language game express
immanent elements that specify a kind of use, practice or life form interwoven
with this linguistic framework. Such elements can only be shown. They cannot
be said, that is, they cannot be used in ‘factual’ propositions that delineate a
space of reality in the world. This is due to the fact they are a condition of the
meaningfulness of propositions of this second type, and are thus the hinges of
the game on which the texture of the world depends.
In the following I will try to show, (1) that this ontological contrast
separates Husserl from Frege, two figures who nonetheless coincide in an anti-
naturalist idealism, (2) that continental philosophy of the 20th century
incorporates a reaction against the foundational idealist aspect in Husserl’s
thought, and follows a course of locating sense in the world, whereby the
ontology of events is nonetheless preserved. In my final reflections I will
maintain that the analytic tradition has followed a course that is structurally
analogous to the previous.16 It incorporates a reaction against Fregean
idealism, and it adopts the course of a naturalization of meaning which
preserves the ontology of facts and to that extent preserves also the above-
mentioned conflict with the continental tradition. 
2.1. The conflict in the phase of anti-naturalist idealism: Husserl and Frege
If we probe the philosophy of Frege in the light of the previous analysis, it
is possible to find in it a phenomenological vocation. Frege distinguished two
fundamental semiotic functions as a result of which expressions both have a
reference and express a sense.17 Sense coincides, in the realm of nominal
expressions, with the mode in which language presents us the object, such that
sense is, according to Frege, a property of this mode of presentation. The sense
of sentences is more complex and is expressed as ideas or thoughts. In both
cases the referential reality is mediated by the intensional dimension of the
sign function. The content of the understanding of the world – the continental
philosopher would say – belongs to the medium of sense. And, what is
especially interesting, this content seems to originate in a mode of presentation
of the referent. All this invites us to suppose that the Fregean definition of the
real belongs to the dimension of what in Husserlian terminology is
denominated, as we have examined, its nóematic Being: its appearance as
sense.
Together with this unity of vocation, the two authors have an anti-naturalist
idealism in common. This is quite clear in the case of Husserl, for the
phenomena of sense, or nóemata, are in his philosophy considered as ideal
entities, and are never reducible to the contingency of time, culture or nature
(and hence are not natural facts). Something analogous can be found in Frege’s
philosophy.18 Thoughts, for Frege, are ideal occurrences and, in contrast with
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psychological sensations, are not part of the causal nexus that constitutes the
mechanism of the actual world. They are not part of that actual (wirkliche)
world that is held together through the iron lines of causality.
There are, however, at least two big differences between Husserl and Frege
in which the ontological gap to which I have been referring is manifest. The
first has to do with the forms of their idealism. In accordance with the
correlation that Husserl establishes between nóesis and nóema, sense is not
only understood as an apprehendable ideality. That which shows itself by itself
(the phenomenon of sense) is at the same time constituted in the subjectivity
to which it presents itself. However, in Frege’s theory there is no analogon of
the aspect that correlates with this apprehension. We do not find in it a parallel
analysis that would have transcendental acts as their object, in virtue of which
thoughts are constituted as meaningful entities for the subject. The world of
experience is for Frege a world of merely psychological acts, and hence he
does not feel compelled to affirm the ontological productivity of life, its force
of generating reality.
This difference leads us to a second element of contrast, and one that is
fundamental. Here their distance from each other concerns the meaning of the
concept of sense itself. According to the phenomenological point of view, the
real as constituted in the life-world is a mode of appearance and is not
reducible to a description or explication of that which appears as a compound
of contents and attributes. But if one pays close attention, sense, for Frege, is
primordially bound up not with this dynamic dimension, but with contents that
can be logically described or reconstructed. Frege thought that the sense of a
nominal expression could be objectified in a descriptive expression, and that
the thought (or sense expressed in sentences) can be objectified in propositions
and reconstructed by means of using a formal logic. It is enough in this context
to remember that the Fregean horizon as proposed in his Conceptography is,
as the subtitle itself summarizes, that of a “language of formulas, similar to
that of arithmetic for expressing pure thought”.
What turned out ontologically crucial for Husserl – the event itself of
presenting something in its How (correlative to the life-world as the sphere of
acts) – remains on the margin of what is emphasized by Frege’s concept of
sense, namely the semantic content insofar as it is an objectifiable static
dimension. This contrast is a paradigmatic example of the difference that I
have tried to establish between ontology of events and ontology of facts.
2.2. The continental process of locating sense in the world
Both the post-Husserlian continental philosophy and the post-Fregean
analytic tradition actually coincide in one vocation: that of establishing –
independently of idealism – the processes of signification on the ground of the
facticity of the world. Their distance from each other is nonetheless at the
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same time maintained, for in the case of continental philosophy its general
direction is towards locating sense in the world in which the ontology of events
is preserved, while in the case of analytic philosophy the direction is towards
a naturalization of meaning in which the ontology of facts is firmly adhered to.
In this section I will restrict myself to giving a summary account of the
continental positions, making reference to its principal currents of thought:
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, post-idealist French phenomenology,
hermeneutics, the Habermasio-Apelian new enlightenment and the thought of
difference.
The first two above-mentioned lines of thought coincide chiefly in their
deepening and twisting of the phenomenological conception of the real, while
shifting the conditions of the constitution of sense from transcendental
consciousness (Husserl) to a pre-reflective existence. In this way Heidegger
does not abandon Husserl’s key principle, but rather locates the phenomena of
sense in the field of pre-conceptual experience, thereby transforming
phenomenology into a hermeneutics of Dasein.19 It is clear that the ontology of
events is preserved in this new terrain. For Being is conceived as the
movement itself of “coming into presence” or “unveiling” (ßh<˘eia) that is
never reducible to what is presented or occurs.20
An analogous transformation can be found in M. Merleau-Ponty, the main
protagonist of that post-idealist French line of thought to which P. Ricœur has
given the name of existential phenomenology,21 and whose influence comes
back these days with a certain intensity.22 The pre-reflective terrain in which,
in this case, the world is forged as an experience of sense, is that of the carnal
subject, that of an intelligent corporality or savage being (être brut). The
constitution of the real is on this ground understood also in dynamic
categories: it concerns the “opening” of coordinates responsible for the
possession of a world,23 of the spoken word (parole parlée) by means of which
sense occurs and is made present through a state of arising,24 or it concerns the
interrogative questioning25 prior to any space of reflection. As B. Waldenfels
claims with great mastery, the French philosopher was in all cases thinking of
a vertical dimension of the generation of sense, one that is never reducible to
the horizontal plane of descriptions or explanations of objects.26
If we now reflect on hermeneutics, we have no great difficulties in detecting
another variant of the same ontology of events. In the perspective of Gadamer,
Heidegger’s principal disciple, the occurrence of Being is re-described as the
upsurge and joining of different interpretations of the world, as the living
dialogue of history. Events are now the movement of understanding itself and
of understanding oneself within horizons of sense, a participatory process that
can never be arrested by means of a methodological look, i.e., through
representations distanced from occurring facts.27 In an analogous way, Ricœur
has, since his earliest works, defended the irreducibility of interpretation, as an
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emerging event that is both rule-less and creative, with respect to the stratum
of meanings sedimented in the explicit structure of language.28
We may at this point affirm that these three great lines of 20th Century
continental philosophy locate sense in the world. The phenomenological
conception develops a world-conception of sense to the extent that it is forced
to radicalize the regress to the life-world advocated by Husserl. This is done
by means of providing the supposed foundational character of subject-
consciousness with a different and deeper ground. The constitution of that
which we call real is actually made dependent on a life-world, or Lebenswelt,
with respect to which the reflective subject itself, the Cartesian subject, is no
longer the origin but the product. The investigation of self-consciousness is
replaced by a pre-reflective self-understanding and is made derivative with
respect to it.
Nevertheless, this complex deepening of the regress to the life-world does
not break up the correlation that Husserl established between the subject and
the world, that complex and subtle relation that the father of phenomenology
established between constitution (by the subject) and self-presentation (by the
things themselves). This correlation, rather, is itself deepened and shifted. The
bond between nóesis and nóema is now transformed to a connection between
two mutually dependent events: on the one side the event of pre-reflective
projection (as carried out by Dasein, the intelligent body or the interpreting
agent); on the other side the event of coming into presence of the thing itself
from an open horizon of sense.
The Habermasio-Apelian conception of reason already includes, in its very
enlightenment terrain, a world-conception of logos, as the result of
overcoming Kantian idealism by means of characterizing rationality as
centred, that is, as inherent in the communicative praxis of the life-world.29
Situated in this realm of inner-worldly reason, the authors did not get rid of the
nutritive soil of hermeneutics but have rather added to it. They both recognize
that it is necessary to accept that the historical and corporeal opening of sense
is a condition of what we call rational or true. Their critique consists in trying
to show that together with this pre-logical dimension of events there evolves
in history a process of justification of validity through argumentative
discourse, and that between these two moments there holds a productive circle
whose regulative idea is a counterfactual ideal speech situation (Habermas) or
ideal community of communication (Apel).30 This amendment that preserves
the ontology of events can further be perceived in all aspects of the new theory
of enlightenment. In this way, for instance, finding out the presuppositions of
reason (that is, of the universals of communicative rationality), is claimed by
the authors to consist in the awareness in actu that we have “always already”
(immer schon) recognized them. They thus possess a vertical reality in
contrast to the horizontal nature of actual communication, to the point that
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Apel did not hesitate to clarify them, pitting Heidegger against Heidegger, as
elements that belong to the “pre-structure” of being-in-the-world.31 It is
already obvious that the rational element in the theories of Habermas and Apel
is not a corpus of factualities (rules, facts, principles), but of presuppositions
that possess the dynamic texture of a phenomenon. They certainly do not
occur contingently, like in the three lines of thought analyzed above. If they
are nonetheless a priori, this is due to the fact that they occur necessarily when
rational activity gets underway.
In the case that was just analyzed, the continental ontology of events reveals
a new face within a universalistic and enlightened code, inasmuch as the
ontological conception of the real as sense is amended from within. In the
French movement that has come to call itself the thought of difference (by
authors like Deleuze, Lyotard or Derrida), we find an extremely radicalized
version of this ontology, and one that leads to an internal subversion. If we take
the especially influential example of Derrida, we can confirm that what
Heidegger means by the “occurrence of Being” is put in question without
abandoning a dynamic conception of what we call experience. According to
this author, that which we call an experience of the world is something that
adopts the form of difference. In an early work he clarifies this concept by
taking recourse to the aporias between force (dynamis) and meaning
(presence, form, structure).32 The static meaning paralyzes the dynamis, the
force. Derrida then concludes that that which occurs in experience is a
paradox, consisting in a dynamic emergence of a sense that collapses in this
very same movement. This is not, as in Heidegger, an uncovering of sense but
the impossibility of sense.
This summary account is sufficient to make us aware of the fact that
Derrida stays attached to a conception of the real that preserves its
characterization as event as the occurrence of difference. From another
perspective, what Lyotard and Deleuze call difference is also a phenomenon
that occurs.33 In the first, it occurs as a struggle between heterogeneous
languages,34 while, in the second, it is manifest as the movement that arises
from the encounter of two opposed forces or intensities.35 In any case, in this
French current of thought the ontology of sense is not abandoned in any strict
sense either. For thinking difference implies, first of all, to situate oneself
within a conception for which the real coincides in principle with the mode of
presentation of experiences, with the signifying quality of its mode of being,
and thus, secondly, the rupture or the internal aporia that constitutes this
movement can be shown. If it be allowed to use a metaphor, it could be said
that this locating of sense in the world becomes more extreme at this point
insofar as it is turned more profane: the temple of sense is not being ignored
but gets penetrated and its hidden and demonic face, its negativity, is
unmasked.36
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3. The analytic naturalization of meaning and the conflict between the
ontologies of events and of facts 
If we compare what has occurred in the analytic tradition of the 20th
century with the above continental movement, we will come across sufficient
reasons in order to affirm a structural analogy. In Anglo-American circles, too,
there is a predominant process of surrendering an idealist anti-naturalism, in
this case that of Frege. For the philosophy of language has kept up a tendency
towards a naturalization of meaning, that is, to link the processes of
signification to conditions that are internal to the natural world. Fodor has
described this process as a general ontological course according to which
linguistic meaning is explainable along the same lines as, and as a continuation
of, physico-natural reality.37 In accordance with the concept of an ontology of
facts, as introduced above, this process contrasts with continental thought
independently of the fact that the concept of the natural is associated with a
physical description. The key to this contrast is contained in the fact that the
natural is understood as the realm of objects or relations which can be
represented and, at least in principle, reconstructed from law-like explanations
or objectifiable descriptions. And it is also possible that this propensity is
displayed within very distinct perspectives. I will point out three fundamental
ones: one logical, another pragmatic and a third concerning the philosophy of
mind.
From a logical viewpoint, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus amounts to a
fundamental step in this naturalization, because it reduces the intensional
dimension of meaning to the extensional, to the reference, and the latter to the
explainable or describable facts. Logical neopositivism took this as its point of
departure, and it terminated in a scientific verificationism, thereby crossing
paths with a phenomenalism that tends to reduce the constitution of objects to
manifest psychological experiences.38
Wittgenstein basically identified the world with a logical form of language
as a profound structure that only shows itself and that cannot be “said” by
means of referential procedures. It could be thought that this position separates
Wittgenstein from the ontology of facts, as opposed to what his vehement
Viennese followers may have thought. And in fact, strong analogies may be
drawn with Heidegger’s thought, in the sense that the above profound essence
of language and of the world, just like the phenomenon of Being, cannot be
represented.39 Now, despite this structural similarity, an ontological gap is
visible between them. For the logical form is not thought of as a dimension of
events, but as a rigid and profound form of lawfulness. If it cannot actually be
represented, it is at least conceived according to a standard of representation
and indeed conceived as a static structure.
But the logical point of view was not abandoned in the decline of
neopositivism. This is apparent, firstly, in a persisting tendency to a certain
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opposition with the continental ontology of events, rooted in the Tractatus: that
of considering feasible the reproduction of the phenomena of natural language
by means of formal languages. In a number of different positions this thesis is
maintained during the sixties and seventies by Kripke, Putnam, Davidson,
Montague, D. Lewis, B. Partee, N. Belnap jr., Stalnaker or D. Kaplan, a list to
which in the eighties are added, among others, H. Kamp, Barwise, Perry and
B. Richards.40
The logical project is rediscovered today, secondly, in an attempt that uses
the concept of possible worlds in order to understand linguistic sense as a
logical function. This programme, originally linked with the names Kripke
and Putnam, has managed to constitute the basis for projects like those of
Smith and McIntyre. These are projects that try to clarify phenomenological
concepts, such as those of nóema and world of sense, through a logico-
mathematical formalization.41 And there is also a tendency to substitute the
dynamical dimension of the constitution of sense for a lawful structure.
In the context of the pragmatic tradition we must at least be aware, first, of
the line of thought that derives from Wittgenstein’s turn, second, of the theory
of speech acts and, last, of American neopragmatism – three strands that have
contributed to such a naturalization by locating the processes of signification
among the uses and habits of praxis. The first of them has explicitly served as
battleground for the conflict between the great traditions. In his
Philosophische Untersuchungen, Wittgenstein had associated meaning with
use and the internal forms of life with concrete language games. The analogy
with Heidegger is again apparent. For one could interpret the concept of a
language game as being in tune with that of the world of sense, if one
considers that to participate in a linguistic praxis implies belonging to an
understanding of the world that cannot be represented. But this does not seem
the predominant reception in the analytic tradition. And so Kripke’s
communitarian interpretation came to be very influential; it explained the
practices in the games in terms of a behaviourist naturalism, as the describable
modes of behaviour of a community.42 And a naturalist project can also be
attributed to the holistic views held by authors such as Quine and Davidson.43
The theory of speech acts, as developed by Austin and Searle, also lends
itself to an analogy with the continental tradition. As indicated by Derrida, this
conception suggests a recognition of the dynamic dimension of speech that
cannot be represented, and it does so by making the meaning of propositions
depend on the performative aspect of the acts in which they occur: the
performative aspect is thought of as a force.44 But again it seems that if we take
a closer look we can recognize here a case of the ontology of facts. For, as
Searle has indicated, the speech acts evolve within a framework of a behaviour
governed by rules, rules that belong to conventions and that are institutional
facts.45
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Finally, American pragmatism (like that of Dewey) links the meaning of
expressions to practical foreseeable operations. Operationalism in physics,
behaviourism in psychology or sociologism in the theory of knowledge are
expressions of this line of thought. The institutional facts that Searle refers to,
as much as the pragmata that the American pragmatism thinks of, are quite
obviously governed realties and can be represented by descriptions or
explanations. They are factualities, though nonetheless very different from
that vertical and dynamic reality that Merleau-Ponty, for instance, recognizes
as being at the basis of all corporeal operation or of all behaviour, and which
he defines as a creation of rules that itself is not, and cannot be, governed by
rules.
As I have indicated, the movement that seems currently predominant in the
philosophy of mind is one of computational functionalism. But even in non-
reductionist positions opposed to it we can rediscover, though on a different
level, the ontology of facts. I will consider two examples.
The first example makes reference to Davidson. The anomalous monism
that he defends tries to make the irreducibility of the intentional compatible
with a materialist characterization of the mind.46 The argument goes as
follows: the content of a mental state cannot be determined other than in
relation to a complex holistic network of states that constitute the global
context. Now, if this is the case, then the mental states, though they may be
identical with physical states when taken in isolation, cannot be taken as
correlatives of the determined physical causal chain. Any connection between
a mental and a physical property would only have an accidental character, and
would always be insufficient for establishing lawful predictions. This position,
then, does not escape the ontology of facts either. In reality, the irreducibility
of the mental-intentional aspect is not made by Davidson to depend on its
ontological character, but on the fact that the epistemological access turns out
insufficient or limited in order to get to a material reality. But for the
continental philosopher, the irreducible character of an non-naturalizable
dimension has an entirely ontological sense.
The last example refers to authors who return explicitly to positions of
continental origin, such as that of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, in order to
confront them with computational functionalism. Among them are H.L.
Dreyfus, A. Clark, R.A. Brooks, J. Mc Dowell and M. Wheeler. If this recourse
is made rigorously, then, naturally, we will not find a reason for controversy.
The problem arises from a suspicion as to whether they do indeed do justice
to the ontology of events that is implicit in its sources. Without wishing to
generalize, it is quite possible that in the translation of the continental source
into the analytic context the former may have been purged of its ontology and
forced into a re-elaboration based on the ontology of facts. This impression is
produced by at least some of their contributions to the idea of an artificial life.47
134
A common idea in these contributions is that human activity is a combination
of abilities and practices that are not intentional states and which hence do not
possess a representational content, which is why they cannot be explained in
terms of elements and rules. If this impression were correct, then our
objections would be similar to the ones brought to bear against Searle. In order
to do justice to the continental position it is not enough to admit the existence
of a pre-representational world, but to rediscover the intentional dimension in
the profound origin of such a world. Otherwise its constitutive elements are
reduced to contents of another kind. And this is not, as was shown above, what
the continental philosopher thinks of, because what he does think of is rather
the force of generation or opening-up which is presupposed in the presentation
of whatever content.
We not only detect a profound difference between the two traditions. We
also detect a risk that this difference should end up in a mutual indifference.
This would be something quite unusual in the history of philosophy. For until
now, the opposed positions have, in one way or another, constantly entered
into controversy. But those of us who dedicate themselves to philosophy today
are confronted with a situation in which both traditions are closing themselves
off from each other. It is not the conflict but the possibility that the strength for
a proper conflict is lost that constitutes the actual risk. To know what it is that
separates the one tradition from the other is a necessary condition for engaging
in this real and rewarding conflict.
Universidad de Granada
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